epistemic blame: the nature and norms of epistemic relationships
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July 2024: Out now! Order here. Read the Introduction here. From 2019-2022, this project was supported by a Research Manitoba: New Investigator Operating Grant. Read an interview about the project for Research Manitoba here. And here is a recent interview about epistemic blame on the podcast Plato's Cave. Cover art: @khanblaai |
OVERVIEW
This book is about our practice of criticizing one another for epistemic failings. We clearly evaluate and critique one another for forming unjustified beliefs, harbouring biases, and pursuing faulty methods of inquiry. But what is the nature of this criticism? Does it ever rise to the level of blame? The question is puzzling because there are competing sources of pressure in our intuitions about “epistemic blame”, ones not easy to reconcile. The more blame-like a response is, the less at home in the epistemic domain it seems — but the more at home in the epistemic domain a response is, the less blame-like it seems. These competing sources of pressure constitute a puzzle about epistemic blame. The most promising solution to this puzzle focuses on the interpersonal side of epistemic normativity. Members of an epistemic community stand in an “epistemic relationship”, and epistemic blame is a way of modifying this relationship. Understanding epistemic blame as a distinctive kind of relationship modification locates a response that is both robustly blame-like, and entirely at home in the epistemic domain. Epistemic relationships can also illuminate a unique set of issues in the “ethics of epistemic blame”, ones that mirror corresponding issues in the ethics of moral blame. The book examines the scope of appropriate epistemic blame, standing to epistemically blame, and the value of epistemic blame in our social and political lives. Throughout the investigation, a better understanding of the parallels and points of interaction between the epistemic and other normative domains emerges.
CHAPTER ABSTRACTS
Chapter 1: The Puzzle of Epistemic Blame
This chapter motivates the idea that there is an epistemic kind of blame. One reason to take this idea seriously comes from reflections on parallels between epistemology and ethics. Another comes from considerations about the role that blame and blameworthiness play in contemporary epistemology. The chapter examines the role that epistemic blame plays in debates about epistemic justification, doxastic control, and the “authority” of epistemic normativity. The chapter then introduces a puzzle. The puzzle arises when aiming to achieve two distinct, but closely related and equally important theoretical goals: i) explaining what makes epistemic blame more significant than mere negative epistemic evaluation, and ii) doing so without invoking attitudes, behaviours, or practices that seem out of place in the epistemic domain. The chapter articulates these competing sources of pressure, developing criteria that an account of epistemic blame must meet in order to resolve the puzzle of epistemic blame.
Chapter 2: Negative Emotions and Frustrated Desires
Two approaches to resolving the puzzle of epistemic blame are examined. The first argues that epistemic blame is a negative emotional response. Three ways of pursuing this idea are considered—a bold, moderate, and sui generis version. It is argued that all three approaches are inadequate because they rely on attitudes that are out of place in the epistemic domain. The second approach argues that epistemic blame is the manifestation of an unsatisfied desire with distinctively epistemic content. This approach improves on negative-emotion views by accounting for epistemic blame’s significance with a conative component—something that seems more at home in the epistemic domain. However, it is argued that the approach does not go far enough in accounting for epistemic blame’s significance. The shortcomings of both approaches to epistemic blame reveal a role for relationships in epistemic blame.
Chapter 3: A Relationship-Based Account of Epistemic Blame
This chapter develops the idea that epistemic blame is a kind of relationship-modification. At the heart of the account is the notion of an epistemic relationship, a kind of relationship that people have with one another insofar as they are epistemic agents in an epistemic community. The chapter develops an account of what it is to modify one’s epistemic relationship with another person, and argues that certain ways of modifying one’s epistemic relationship with another amount to a kind of blame response. The relationship-based framework is the subject of controversy in the moral domain. In light of this, the chapter addresses some core challenges facing this framework in the moral domain. The primary aim is to motivate the claim that the framework can fruitfully be extended to the epistemic domain, setting the stage for a resolution of the puzzle of epistemic blame.
Chapter 4: The Significance and Fittingness of Epistemic Blame
By linking the motivational component of epistemic blame to relationship modification, the relationship-based account can tell us something deeper about the nature of epistemic blame than the previous accounts. The chapter defends this claim in three main stages. First, it is argued that epistemic relationship modification can account for epistemic blame’s significance. Second, it is argued that epistemic relationship modification is at home in the epistemic domain. Third, the chapter advertises some further advantages of the account over its competitors, and responds to the most pressing remaining objections—including appeals to cool blame, self-blame, and blame of the dead and distant. This completes the argument that the relationship-based account can resolve the puzzle of epistemic blame.
Chapter 5: Blameworthy Belief, Assertion, and Other Epistemic Harms
This chapter examines the scope of appropriate epistemic blame. What would a complete list of behaviours and attitudes for which people can be epistemically blameworthy look like? The chapter begins by examining whether people can be epistemically blameworthy for things like dogmatism and wishful thinking. One concern about this idea is the well-worn question of whether people can be blameworthy for doxastic states which seem beyond their control. The relationship-based account is deployed to make sense of epistemic blame for attitudes that are not under direct voluntary control. The chapter turns its attention to assertion, testimonial injustice, and other forms of “epistemic harm”, such as epistemic exploitation and gaslighting. Important challenges arise when examining epistemic blameworthiness in each case. The chapter’s main aim is to argue that epistemic relationships are a useful tool for illuminating the nature of a wide variety of failings, and illustrating their connection to epistemic blame.
Chapter 6: Standing
This chapter examines standing to blame in an epistemic context. The primary focus is the so-called “business condition” on standing to blame. According to the business condition, standing is constrained by the extent to which the target of blame’s wrongdoing is the blamer’s business. The chapter examines an apparent tension between the business condition and the fact that it is not always clear whose business an epistemic failing is, and why. The relationship-based account is well-positioned to make sense of this apparent tension. Careful attention to the issue is fruitful for a number of reasons. First, it provides a useful angle for exploring what entitles us to the normative expectations partially constituting our epistemic relationships. Second, it allows us to develop detailed answers to questions about the variable strength of epistemic blame, and its interaction with other normative domains. The chapter closes with a discussion of epistemic hypocrisy and complicity.
Chapter 7: The Value of Epistemic Blame
Should we epistemically blame one another? This chapter examines the value of our epistemic blaming practices, and considers alternatives to epistemic blame. The chapter approaches these questions, first, by focusing on a case study: the realm of democratic participation. It is argued that epistemic blame—as understood on the relationship-based model—has value insofar as it constitutes a distinctive way of holding others, especially leaders, to account in the democratic sphere. The case study paves the way for more general observations about the value of epistemic blame. The chapter turns to a detailed examination of whether certain kinds of positively valanced epistemic relationship modification might be more fitting or productive (or both), as ways of responding to culpable epistemic failings. It is argued on the basis of considerations about autonomy, efficacy, and social justice that they are not.
This chapter motivates the idea that there is an epistemic kind of blame. One reason to take this idea seriously comes from reflections on parallels between epistemology and ethics. Another comes from considerations about the role that blame and blameworthiness play in contemporary epistemology. The chapter examines the role that epistemic blame plays in debates about epistemic justification, doxastic control, and the “authority” of epistemic normativity. The chapter then introduces a puzzle. The puzzle arises when aiming to achieve two distinct, but closely related and equally important theoretical goals: i) explaining what makes epistemic blame more significant than mere negative epistemic evaluation, and ii) doing so without invoking attitudes, behaviours, or practices that seem out of place in the epistemic domain. The chapter articulates these competing sources of pressure, developing criteria that an account of epistemic blame must meet in order to resolve the puzzle of epistemic blame.
Chapter 2: Negative Emotions and Frustrated Desires
Two approaches to resolving the puzzle of epistemic blame are examined. The first argues that epistemic blame is a negative emotional response. Three ways of pursuing this idea are considered—a bold, moderate, and sui generis version. It is argued that all three approaches are inadequate because they rely on attitudes that are out of place in the epistemic domain. The second approach argues that epistemic blame is the manifestation of an unsatisfied desire with distinctively epistemic content. This approach improves on negative-emotion views by accounting for epistemic blame’s significance with a conative component—something that seems more at home in the epistemic domain. However, it is argued that the approach does not go far enough in accounting for epistemic blame’s significance. The shortcomings of both approaches to epistemic blame reveal a role for relationships in epistemic blame.
Chapter 3: A Relationship-Based Account of Epistemic Blame
This chapter develops the idea that epistemic blame is a kind of relationship-modification. At the heart of the account is the notion of an epistemic relationship, a kind of relationship that people have with one another insofar as they are epistemic agents in an epistemic community. The chapter develops an account of what it is to modify one’s epistemic relationship with another person, and argues that certain ways of modifying one’s epistemic relationship with another amount to a kind of blame response. The relationship-based framework is the subject of controversy in the moral domain. In light of this, the chapter addresses some core challenges facing this framework in the moral domain. The primary aim is to motivate the claim that the framework can fruitfully be extended to the epistemic domain, setting the stage for a resolution of the puzzle of epistemic blame.
Chapter 4: The Significance and Fittingness of Epistemic Blame
By linking the motivational component of epistemic blame to relationship modification, the relationship-based account can tell us something deeper about the nature of epistemic blame than the previous accounts. The chapter defends this claim in three main stages. First, it is argued that epistemic relationship modification can account for epistemic blame’s significance. Second, it is argued that epistemic relationship modification is at home in the epistemic domain. Third, the chapter advertises some further advantages of the account over its competitors, and responds to the most pressing remaining objections—including appeals to cool blame, self-blame, and blame of the dead and distant. This completes the argument that the relationship-based account can resolve the puzzle of epistemic blame.
Chapter 5: Blameworthy Belief, Assertion, and Other Epistemic Harms
This chapter examines the scope of appropriate epistemic blame. What would a complete list of behaviours and attitudes for which people can be epistemically blameworthy look like? The chapter begins by examining whether people can be epistemically blameworthy for things like dogmatism and wishful thinking. One concern about this idea is the well-worn question of whether people can be blameworthy for doxastic states which seem beyond their control. The relationship-based account is deployed to make sense of epistemic blame for attitudes that are not under direct voluntary control. The chapter turns its attention to assertion, testimonial injustice, and other forms of “epistemic harm”, such as epistemic exploitation and gaslighting. Important challenges arise when examining epistemic blameworthiness in each case. The chapter’s main aim is to argue that epistemic relationships are a useful tool for illuminating the nature of a wide variety of failings, and illustrating their connection to epistemic blame.
Chapter 6: Standing
This chapter examines standing to blame in an epistemic context. The primary focus is the so-called “business condition” on standing to blame. According to the business condition, standing is constrained by the extent to which the target of blame’s wrongdoing is the blamer’s business. The chapter examines an apparent tension between the business condition and the fact that it is not always clear whose business an epistemic failing is, and why. The relationship-based account is well-positioned to make sense of this apparent tension. Careful attention to the issue is fruitful for a number of reasons. First, it provides a useful angle for exploring what entitles us to the normative expectations partially constituting our epistemic relationships. Second, it allows us to develop detailed answers to questions about the variable strength of epistemic blame, and its interaction with other normative domains. The chapter closes with a discussion of epistemic hypocrisy and complicity.
Chapter 7: The Value of Epistemic Blame
Should we epistemically blame one another? This chapter examines the value of our epistemic blaming practices, and considers alternatives to epistemic blame. The chapter approaches these questions, first, by focusing on a case study: the realm of democratic participation. It is argued that epistemic blame—as understood on the relationship-based model—has value insofar as it constitutes a distinctive way of holding others, especially leaders, to account in the democratic sphere. The case study paves the way for more general observations about the value of epistemic blame. The chapter turns to a detailed examination of whether certain kinds of positively valanced epistemic relationship modification might be more fitting or productive (or both), as ways of responding to culpable epistemic failings. It is argued on the basis of considerations about autonomy, efficacy, and social justice that they are not.
