NORMS OF EPISTEMIC CRITICISM
From 2022-2025, this project is supported by an SSHRC Insight Development Grant. The project examines normative questions about our practice of epistemic blame and criticism. The project aims to:
i) Develop the first detailed account of degrees of epistemic criticizability, and examine how such an account can illuminate questions about when epistemic criticism is a fitting response ("Degrees of Epistemic Criticizability" is now forthcoming in The Philosophical Quarterly).
ii) Explore standing to epistemically blame, specifically with a focus on complicity and hypocrisy in the epistemic domain ("Epistemic Complicity" is provisionally forthcoming in Episteme - email for draft).
iii) Examine connections between epistemic blame and social power, including:
i) Develop the first detailed account of degrees of epistemic criticizability, and examine how such an account can illuminate questions about when epistemic criticism is a fitting response ("Degrees of Epistemic Criticizability" is now forthcoming in The Philosophical Quarterly).
ii) Explore standing to epistemically blame, specifically with a focus on complicity and hypocrisy in the epistemic domain ("Epistemic Complicity" is provisionally forthcoming in Episteme - email for draft).
iii) Examine connections between epistemic blame and social power, including:
- how social power can problematically exclude groups from our (epistemic) blaming practices.
- how unjust balances in social power can generate obligations on groups to reflect on, and modify, their (epistemic) blaming practices.
